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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Hurricane Katrina is widely regarded as the greatest natural disaster to ever befall 
the United States. Following the storm’s devastation of the Gulf Coast region, a media 
firestorm unleashed, seeking to ascribe responsibility to governmental actors for the 
“failed” response effort. Through a comparative framing analysis, this study sought to 
investigate how major news outlets, the White House, and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency framed the response efforts that followed Hurricane Katrina.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
On Thursday, August 25, 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 
Five hurricane. Hurricane Katrina was labeled the greatest natural disaster to ever hit the 
United States, leaving in its wake incalculable loss. Shortly after the storm passed, news 
stories broke. In the months following, major newspapers broke hundreds of articles 
recounting the utter devastate created by the storm, and the inadequacies of a federal 
government to prepare and respond to Katrina.  
In 1963, Bernard Cohen made an insightful observation when he stated, “[the press] 
may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Although the issue is still 
up for debate, some scholars believe that reporters and editors frame stories in a way that 
focuses on or reflect their personal feelings (Kuypers, 2009). This study seeks to compare 
the frames presented by the media, and compare those to the original reports provided by 
the White House Press Secretary and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).   
To understand framing analysis, one must first understand what a frame is. Jim 
Kuypers (2010), political communication scholar and framing researcher defined framing 
as, “a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a 
point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a 
particular manner.” In essence, a frame is the central or underlying theme under which 
the facts or details are organized. The process of framing a particular event requires the 
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construction of a particular viewpoint, emphasizing certain facts to produce a specific 
interpretation of that event. 
 Framing analysis can be likened to the framing of a picture. When you frame a 
picture, you have to select a frame that best suites the image. The frame may enhance 
certain visual elements such as color, texture, or image within the photograph. If you 
were to reframe the photograph, other elements or colors might become more apparent to 
the viewer. Just as the frame changes the way a picture is viewed, the frame in which we 
place events or ideas will have the same effect. Frames force us to filter our perceptions 
in a very particular way, either enhancing or taking away from certain elements, 
ultimately appealing to the framer’s view of the situation. As an acting definition, 
framing is the process whereby communicators, consciously or subconsciously, construct 
a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a particular situation to be viewed, 
emphasizing certain facts while deemphasizing others.  
Framing analysis is a derivative of agenda- setting theory first postulated by 
McCombs and Reynolds in 1972. The central thesis of the theory hinges upon the 
argument that the “[media has the] ability to influence the salience of topics on the public 
agenda.” In short, the more salient an issue is, the more important the viewing audience 
will regard the issue to be. Mass media outlets have demonstrated this concept through 
the coverage of election campaigns, murder trials, and international conflict. While these 
major events are inherently important, the focus and attention given to those issues only 
serves to enhance the importance of the elements of the specific issues for the consumer.  
Given the written account and detailed descriptions provided by governmental agencies 
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and the media, employing a comparative framing analysis as the research method for this 
study should provide particularly fruitful results.  
Based on the theory of agenda setting, a study done in the early 1970s found that, 
when asked, voters tend to share a commonality with what the media establishes as 
important. As agenda setting theory establishes what we, as readers should think about, 
agenda extension suggests how we should think about the issue at hand (Kuypers, 2009). 
As a method of approaching agenda extension, reporters not only establish what is being 
talked about, but also directly influence how we think about them in a value-laden sense 
of the word. One method by which this influence is channeled is through framing. This is 
accomplished through the process of pulling specific characteristics of an event and 
assembling a narrative that promotes a specific interpretation.  
When put in the context of news reporting, the demonstration of the process becomes 
clear. Rarely do news reports contain every detail of an event. If reporting every detail 
became the norm, the news would not be digestible. Instead, news reports collect the data 
necessary to relay the general details of a particular event to the audience. The process by 
which the author filters certain details out, includes others, or highlights specific details 
more than others demonstrates the construction of a frame. At times, personal or 
institutional biases influence the decision as to what to include, exclude, or highlight in a 
given story.  
 This practice is equally true of governmental reporting. Although it cannot be 
empirically proven, much of the data collected in this study would suggest that the biases 
in governmental agencies are institutional, rather than individual. Governmental reporting 
4 
 
tends to simply provide basic facts, the detail to which the facts are given and the degree 
to which certain facts are highlighted demonstrate how government reports frame events.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
 
 Studying the messages describing the response to Hurricane Katrina, and the 
effects the messages had, has grown in prominence through the literature base. The role 
that the media played in constructing public knowledge and understanding of the 
recovery efforts has been a focal area of research, and within research, a pivotal point of 
contention for many scholars.  
 In 2007, Fahmy, Kelly, and Kim performed a comparative visual analysis of news 
wires and U.S. newspapers. Specifically, the authors looked to what images were selected 
by newspapers compared to what was made available by newswires. The study found that 
front-page photographs differed greatly between newspapers and newswires. The images 
in newspapers tended to focus more on the victims, specifically non-white victims, rather 
than photographs that encompassed the entirety of the storm. The authors ultimately 
came to the conclusion that by employing visual frames that reflect specific controversial 
issues, news outlets ultimately fail their responsibility of serving as the gatekeeper 
(Lewin, 1943) to information dissemination. The results of their study suggest that the 
role media outlets play in shaping public understanding and interpretation of events is 
indisputable. The decision to select one photograph over another is indicative that media 
bias is present within the selection process. 
 In 2005, Kuypers and Cooper performed a comparative framing analysis of the 
2003 Iraq War. Looking at the stories from the New York Times and the Washington Post, 
the researchers analyzed stories from behind-the-line reporters as compared to stories 
published by embedded journalists. The results of the study found contradictory frames 
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on a given event, even within the same news source on multiple occasions. Although this 
study does not specifically look at framing as it pertains to a natural disaster, it does 
provide an excellent framework for comparing two competing frames. 
Despite the popularity of research in the field of mass communication and a 
growing trend within framing analysis, little work has been done in the field of 
comparative framing analysis. From its beginnings as a formal research method in the 
late 1980’s, framing analysis appears to be an up and coming trend in the field of 
qualitative mass communication research (D'Angelo & Kuyper, 2010). 
Cole & Kelli (2008) looked at risk communication through the case study of 
Hurricane Katrina. As a principle of risk communication analysis, Cole and Kelli suggest 
that a lack of cohesive networks poses a significant threat to the credibility of 
governmental reporting. The study concluded that “message preparation before the crisis 
is essential, and to be effective, messages must be credible to their recipient and 
audience” (Cole & Kelli, 2008). We can draw several concepts from the findings of this 
study. First, the lack of message preparation prior to Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans 
can explain why the media’s framing of the event was preferred over governmental 
reports. Additionally, the acknowledged failures of the emergency communication 
equipment during the initial response may point to decreased credibility of government 
reports.  
 In 2011, Johnson, Dolan, and Sonnett preformed a quantitative content analysis 
looking at racial reporting in national television coverage after Hurricane Katrina. Given 
the dense population of African Americans living within New Orleans during Katrina, the 
authors sought to establish statistical support for claims that news broadcasts propagated 
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racial ideologies. The results of the study concluded an overwhelming presence of whites 
filling speaking roles in news reports, despite the presence of a strong African Americans 
population. The results suggest this was especially true in the hardest hit areas of New 
Orleans. Additionally, the results of the study concluded that reports of African American 
looters were especially critical without giving an opportunity for explanation for the 
behavior. The results of the study suggest that the media is an incredibly powerful tool in 
shaping public sentiment. Additionally, their ability to shape images along racial lines 
must be acknowledged. 
 Building on the concept of public influence, Lundy and Broussard (2007) looked 
at the role of public relations in shaping perception of a crisis event. Through a 
qualitative approach, the authors interviewed fourteen public relations practitioners 
through purposive sampling techniques. The results found, as a matter of practice, that 
news organizations were the main conduit through which organizations communicated 
with the public, including evacuees, citizens, and local constituents. Additionally, public 
relations firms indicated that planning a response for Katrina was not particularly useful, 
given the severity and magnitude of the storm. This research appears to contradict the 
findings of Cole and Kelli, with regards to the construction of messages prior to the 
crisis. Lundy and Broussard assert that the uniqueness of Katrina would render most 
preliminary work useless.  
 In 2006, Durham performed a critical analysis of how the Bush administration 
attempted to report the storm compared to those of mass media outlets. Durham argued 
that the Bush administration sought to displace media reports by distributing news 
releases through Public Broadcast System and National Public Radio. Through displacing 
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traditional news stories, specifically those critical of the Bush administration’s response, 
Durham asserts the Bush administration sought to unhinge professional journalism as a 
legitimate reporting mechanism. This critical approach to analyzing political influence on 
news reporting suggests two issues. The first, that both agents have the ability to 
influence and manipulate public understanding of an event. Secondly, that both agents 
compete for the control or interpretation of a specific event. 
 Although both agents compete for dominant influence over public perception, 
Miller and Goidel in 2009 contend that news organizations are uniquely poised to both 
gather and transmit information, especially during a natural disaster. The case study of 
Katrina, as analyzed by Miller and Goidel, pointed to both the importance of news 
organizations in reporting on disasters as well as the limitations imposed on these reports 
by institutional biases. The researchers contend that news organizations may distort 
reality, perpetuate misinformation, and advance stereotypical analysis while under 
institutional scrutiny. Ultimately, their research suggests that news organizations are 
invaluable in reporting on events, and developments that transpire, but are limited in their 
ability to gather rich information on the issues of causality and consequence. The 
conclusions drawn by Miller and Goidel posit future consideration, especially given the 
consequential nature of reporting surrounding the response effort. They also provide 
insight in understanding the strengths and limitations imposed by institutional norms on 
how news outlets construct understanding, and ultimately build frames for understanding 
the nature of crisis events.  
 As previously stated, news outlets are ideally poised to report on and provide 
details on the development of a particular event (Miller & Goidel, 2009). Sifting through 
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the information and establishing what is important is a key function of the press. Agenda 
setting is the means by which news outlets sift through the details of events and make 
certain characteristics more salient than others. Barnes et al. (2008) looked at media 
agenda setting during Katrina by reviewing local, state, and national newspaper stories. 
Specifically, the authors used Times Picayune, the Advocate, the Washington Post, and 
the New York Times. Through a content analysis, Barnes et al. examined thematic 
changes as disaster response evolved over the year following the storm. The results of the 
study concluded that response systems were either not in place or were not prepared to 
deal with a storm of such magnitude. The perception, whether real or not, that disaster 
response systems were not in place to deal with such an event became a central theme in 
reporting on Katrina, and functions as the focal characteristic of agenda setting employed 
during the storm. 
 Although agenda setting focuses on establishing what we as readers should think 
about, agenda extension expounds on the concept by suggesting not only what we should 
think about, but also how to think about it. In 2006, Sommers et. al analyzed three aspects 
of media depictions of hurricane Katrina. Looking at the relationship between race and 
crisis reporting, the authors perform a critical analysis of the language used to report on 
particular issues. The results of the study found that even word choice affected the 
meaning of the message conveyed. Using terminology such as “refugee,” “evacuees,” 
“survivors,” or “victims” all carried different connotations. In each instance the word 
selected carries with it a unique interpretation of a story (Sommers, Apfelbaum, Dukes, 
Toosi, & Wang, 2006).  
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 Of a similar vein of interest, Voorhees, Vick, and Perkins (2007) studied the 
portrayal of minority groups in the media in the wake of Katrina. Through content 
analysis, the researchers analyzed the nature of minority representation in news 
broadcasts. The results found that the majority of reporting framed ethnic minorities 
almost exclusively as the victim. This construction of minorities as victims served to 
illustrate the role that media takes in shaping the understanding of an event; regardless of 
how accurate that understanding is compared to reality. In many ways the effect these 
interpretations have on public perception of an event serve as contributing variables that 
go into frame construction. 
 While racial roles influence the way the media constructs frames, they are not the 
only point of contention between news story construction and reality. In 2007, Littlefield 
and Quenette looked at the portrayal of authority by media outlets during Katrina. Using 
a Burkean analysis, the researchers sought to understand how the media characterized the 
response effort to Katrina by legitimate authorities. Drawing from news articles out of 
national and local papers, the results found a clustering of results around the military, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the President, and federal/state governments. 
Littlefield and Quenette found the news media stepped outside the role of an objective 
observer and pointed blame towards those within positions of authority. From this 
perspective, the media created an evaluative view of reality. The construction of these 
perspectives, according to the authors, had the ability to influence how authorities frame 
their crisis responses.  
 Just as agenda extension tells us how to think about a particular event, framing 
analysis looks as how the collection of individual interpretations and agendas come 
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together to create an overarching theme which subsumes the events. Cho and Gower 
(2006) studied the effects of human interest as a frame on crisis news coverage. Through 
a factorial analysis, the researchers looked at how human interest frames and non-human 
interest frames compete, under the conditions of accidental and transgressional crises.  
While the results found that there was little difference in blame between accidental and 
transgressional crises, attribution of responsibility was more pronounced when a human-
interest frame was present. From this analysis, we can assert that crisis response measures 
that fail to address human interests as a primary concern are more likely to be viewed in a 
critical light.  
 Although human interest is a focal crisis news frame, An and Gower (2009) found 
additional frames present within crisis reporting. Through a content analysis of crisis 
news in 2006, the authors found responsibility, conflict, morality, economic implications, 
and levels of responsibility to be prevalent frames. The results of the study found that 
news media outlets tend to assign specific blame to an individual or organization for a 
given crisis. This research, apart from expanding the horizons of framing analysis, points 
to the focal question of accountability for Hurricane Katrina. As noted by Cho and Gower 
(2006), even when a crisis is accidental, as was Hurricane Katrina, the assignment of 
responsibility is still present in the extension of media agendas.  
 In 2009, Dill and Wu looked directly at framing in regional and national 
newspapers. Through a content analysis, the authors established a distinct difference 
between the frames of local and frames of national newspapers. Dill and Wu chose to 
look at front-page articles from the Washington Post, New York Times, the New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, and Biloxi Sun Herald for two weeks following the storm. The results of 
12 
 
the study confirmed local newspapers tended to make the destruction and devastation the 
central theme of their reporting, whereas national outlets appeared to cover devastation to 
a lesser extent, trumped by governmental and response criticisms. This research certainly 
sets up the groundwork for a framing analysis, looking at how major news outlets framed 
the events around Katrina, but does not specifically examine how frames compete as 
interpretations of events.  
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Chapter Three: Methods 
 
  A comparative framing analysis was conducted in this study. The study examined 
how both news media outlets and government agencies framed the events of and response 
efforts to Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, the study compared the frames present within 
sixty-five press briefings by the Office of the Press Secretary, 185 press releases from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and contrasted them to the frames 
presented in 312 printed newspaper articles. For the sake of thoroughness, the study 
focused on stories covered by The Washington Post, The New York Times, and USA 
Today. Appendix A has a cited list of all sources looked at in this study.  
 Articles were selected from the three major newspapers using the Lexis Nexis 
search engine. Boolean expressions were used for article identification including 
“hurricane” and “Katrina” in headlines and leads. Press releases and briefings were 
collected from the FEMA Press Release Archives and Office of the Press Secretary 
Archives, respectively. Articles and releases that made minimal references to the storm 
(eg. obituaries, letters to the editor, and news briefs) were excluded from the study.  
There are several reasons why this research measure specifically focused on 
printed stories. First, printed media makes for greater transparency in the research 
method. With both electronic and hard copy versions available, anyone is able to access 
the data used to assess the warrants of the analysis of this study.   Second, this minimized 
the interpretation of vocalic and nonverbal cues present within electronic media. 
Additionally, these papers are widely circulated and are considered papers of record. As 
they are widely circulated, the frames present within are more likely to be influential to a 
14 
 
greater number of readers. To understand the frames employed and to perform a 
comparison, the following research questions were posed:  
 
RQ 1: How did the White House frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina? 
 
RQ 2: How did FEMA frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina? 
 
RQ 3 How did the press frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina? 
 
RQ 4:  Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press 
coincide?  
 
RQ 5: Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press 
contradict?  
 
To identify the frames the researcher read each article, briefing, and press release 
and established a thesis or organizing theme. After establishing the frame, each was 
compiled in a list, according to organization. Once all of the data was examined, the 
process was repeated to confirm the validity of the frames. From there, frames were 
documented and reported. Finally, frames were compared and contrasted to determine 
where correlations or contradictions existed. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
 
White House Framing 
 
 President George W. Bush issued a number of statements and spoke at a number 
of public occasions regarding Hurricane Katrina, this study specifically looked at White 
House Press Briefings from Press Secretaries Scott McClellan and Tony Snow. The 
reasons for this are twofold: First, Presidential press briefings operated much like a 
question and answer period, allowing for pointed questions to be raised and responded to. 
Second, each of the newspapers addressed in this study had a representative at the White 
House briefings. As such, stories published after a briefing may have been influenced by 
the contents of the briefing.  
 As an agency, the White House had a vested interest in framing the response 
efforts in a positive light. Despite numerous attempts by questioners to address outlying 
issues such as rumors, criticisms, and finger-pointing, the White House remained 
steadfast on reporting the successes and continued efforts to address the needs of those 
devastated by Hurricane Katrina. Through this study, two major frames were identified. 
Keeping Focused 
 
 A prominent theme present throughout all reports produced by the White House 
was the importance placed on keeping the focus on response efforts. From the onset of 
the recovery, the White House self-described President Bush and his cabinet as “focused” 
on helping those affected by the storm rebuild and recover. For the first several weeks 
following the storm, excerpts such as the following were present in most briefings: 
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… the President chaired a Cabinet meeting. As you heard from the 
President, this was very much an action-focused meeting. The President called 
this meeting to make sure that we are on top of the immediate needs and that we 
are moving forward on plans to address the long-term response. The President 
wanted to make sure that we are identifying and working to solve problems -- and 
if things are not working as they should, that we are fixing them and making them 
work. People continue to work round-the-clock (Office of the Press Secretary, 
2005, p. 1). 
 
Prefacing each briefing with statements such as these constructed the idea that the 
Bush Administration and his cabinet were focusing a great deal of their efforts helping 
those in need. As floodwaters began to recede, news stories seeking to ascribe 
responsibility for “delayed” or “inadequate” response efforts became more prominent. As 
these stories grew in prominence, the issue of federal accountability became more and 
more prevalent in White House briefings.  
 
Q: Thank you. Recently Fran Townsend, when she came up from that podium, 
and Michael Chertoff, when he testified before Congress, were highly critical of 
former FEMA Director Michael Brown, and specifically both said he went 
outside the established rules for a FEMA director during Katrina. Appearing on 
television last Sunday, Mr. Brown says that is absolutely not true, that both of 
them should know better; he followed the same procedure that every FEMA 
director does in an emergency. Does the White House have an opinion on this? 
MR. McClellan: Well, I think that our view is that we need to continue focusing 
our efforts where they should be, which is on helping the people of the Gulf Coast 
recover and rebuild their communities. That's what the President is doing. That's 
why he visited the region just last week, and that's where we're going to keep our 
focus. We're going to continue working to make sure the federal government is 
doing everything we can to support the people along the Gulf Coast as they 
rebuild their lives and rebuild their communities (Office of the Press Secretary, 
2006, p. 9). 
Despite efforts to draw attention to question of accountability, the White House 
remained dedicated to “staying focused” on helping victims. Excerpts similar to the last 
were present within briefings throughout September, October, and November 2005. The 
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reiteration of the term “focus” brings into light what the overarching frame was that the 
White House projected: 
 
… right now we remain focused on the most immediate priorities, and that is 
continuing to help those who are in need and continuing to make sure they're 
getting the assistance they need and continuing to solve the ongoing problems. 
There are people working round-the-clock. There is a lot of progress that has been 
made, but there are ongoing challenges and ongoing problems. The President is 
not satisfied, and we've got to remain focused on the task at hand. But he made it 
clear that he wants to know what happened and how the response went and what 
the facts are. And we will do that at the appropriate time (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2005, p. 3). 
 
The central idea which subsumes the other details is that the federal government is doing 
everything within its power to address the needs of the victims, and we are seeing results.  
Lessons Learned 
 
Toward the end of the year and the onset of the 2006 hurricane season, questions 
began to arise regarding federal preparation for the “next storm.” As part of addressing 
those concerns, the White House acknowledged some shortcomings to the Katrina 
response efforts: 
 
Our communications system was broken. It was broken between the local 
community and the state. It was broken between the state and the federal 
government, and quite frankly, broken inside the federal government itself. We 
did not have a good system in place to share information. We didn't have a good 
system in place to share communication with each other, to understand what each 
different department was doing from one side of FEMA to the other, from inside 
of DHS; we didn't have a system in place (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006, p. 
4). 
 
This message resonated through the last few months of the study. 
Acknowledgment of responsibility for failed communication systems was a prevalent 
concern in most press briefings, but never actually appeared as a matter of criticism 
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within news reports. At the same token, most of the reports which followed from this 
acknowledged the communication disconnect, but expounded on the issue further. As the 
Director of FEMA stated in a press briefing: 
 
First thing I did was to step back and look at what didn't work in Katrina, what 
things went wrong, what things worked okay but we could have done a lot better. 
And there were several significant things that I saw, based on my experience of 
handling disasters, what I saw simply didn't work. 
The first and foremost was communications. There was a major breakdown in 
communications between the local government and the state government, a 
breakdown between the state government and the federal government, and then, 
quite frankly, a breakdown of communication inside the federal government itself 
between agencies. If you're going to run an operation, that type of communication 
system simply will not work. 
So we went back and looked at how we're going to put this together. We based it 
primarily on the National Response Plan -- we're going to focus on having a 
unified command system. And that will go through our joint field office that you 
guys are familiar with. And everybody has bought into it. We've had exercises at 
the Assistant Secretary level, the Deputy Secretary, and even with the Secretaries 
in the White House. And everyone understands that have to be on the same page. 
As we do our 12R planning blocks, we all have to be there together doing it, 
sharing information and making sure that we're all -- have the same information 
and are responding in the same way (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006, p. 1). 
Ideas similar to these were prevalent throughout White House reports toward the 
end of this study. From these briefings we can extrapolate two major frames. The first, 
that the Bush administration framed the response efforts in terms of dedication towards 
the response effort. Beyond the focus put on the response efforts, the frame suggests the 
administration sought to demonstrate a dedicated and thorough approach to rebuilding 
after Katrina. Secondly, the shortcomings in the response efforts were lessons to be 
learned. Despite the effects that the breakdown in communications had on the response 
efforts, the White House constructed the issue in a way that demonstrated a responsive 
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government, building better response plans for the future.   
 
FEMA Framing 
 
In many respects, the White House and Federal Emergency Management Agency 
sought to frame the response effort in a similar manner. Given shared accountability for 
the successes and failures of the response efforts in the press, this should come as no 
surprise. The approach taken to frame the response as a success differed greatly between 
both organizations. Although the White House framed the response in terms of focused 
and long-term approach, FEMA constructed a similar frame of success through specific 
details of the approach. 
 
A Holistic Approach 
 
FEMA reports covered details of Disaster Medical Response teams deploying 
from all over the country, the number of shelters established, as well as assurance that 
thousands of trucks carrying food, water, and ice were either en route to or had arrived at 
targeted areas with these supplies. (FEMA, 2005) Beyond notification of federal fund 
allocation to the response, FEMA provided a series of notification of additional resources 
allocated to response efforts. These include: 
 
 Legal aid with disaster related legal questions 
 Subsidized debris removal from public property  
 Extended unemployment benefits (initially 26 weeks, but later extended)  
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 Pet rescue  
 Temporary housing 
 Hotel subsidization for displaced victims 
 Minor emergency home repairs  
 Crisis Counseling  
 Translation assistance for federal aid applicants (available in any language)  
 Peace Corps volunteer allocation  
 Community Relations Teams to assist victims with the application process  
 SBA Loans 
 Disaster Recovery Centers  
 
Providing the specific details of what measures were taken to help the victims of Katrina, 
paired with the extensive list of types of aid available, shapes the central theme of the 
FEMA response, FEMA is responding with everything in the arsenal.  
 
By the Numbers 
 
 Throughout the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA instituted the 
practice of publishing weekly details of the emergency, transitional, and reconstructive 
activities being carried out in the gulf. Published at least once weekly, these reports listed 
specific details including, but not limited to, the number of applications for aid received, 
the number of MRE’s (meals-ready-to-eat) distributed, gallons of water handed out, and 
the current dollar figure of federal funds allocated to the response effort. At the onset of 
the storm, press releases such as the following were issued:  
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“The priority at this time is to meet the immediate life saving and life sustaining 
needs of victims in the impacted areas,” said Brown. “FEMA, along with other 
federal partners and state governments, is coordinating a massive mobilization of 
resources for urban search and rescue efforts, housing, food and medical care.” 
Federal response activities include: 
• As of early August 31, more than 54,000 people were in 317 shelters. 
FEMA is working with a multi-state housing task force to address 
expected continued sheltering and eventual housing needs. More than 
82,000 meals have been served in the impacted areas. 
• More than 1,700 trucks have been mobilized through federal, state and 
contract sources to supply ice, water and supplies. These supplies and 
equipment are being moved into the hardest hit areas as quickly as 
possible, especially water, ice, meals, medical supplies, and generators. It 
may, however, take several days for supplies and equipment to reach all 
victims because of damaged and closed roads and bridges. 
• Eighteen of FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue task forces and two 
Incident Support Teams are working in Louisiana and Mississippi Eight 
swift water teams from California are also deployed making a total of 
1,200 people conducting search and rescue missions. All 28 of FEMA’s 
teams are activated for response, with the balance staged, enroute or 
mobilized. 
• Fifty-one teams from the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) have 
been deployed, including five Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMATs) that are supporting New Orleans medical facilities and hospitals 
not fully operational. These teams have truckloads of medical equipment 
and supplies with them and are trained to handle trauma, pediatrics, 
surgery and mental health problems. Additional teams are staged in 
Anniston, Ala.; Camp Shelby, Miss.; and Baton Rouge, La., and will move 
out as conditions permit. 
• NDMS has identified 2,600 hospital beds in a 12-state area around the 
affected area and is working with the U.S. Departments of Defense and 
Veterans Affairs to move patients to these facilities. 
• USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service is providing food at shelters and mass 
feeding sites and issuing emergency food stamps, infant formula and food 
packages to households in need. 
• FEMA is coordinating logistics with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and Louisiana National Guard in support of the ground 
evacuation of refugees sheltered at the Superdome in New Orleans to the 
Houston Astrodome in Harris County, Texas. 
 
A team of 66 transportation experts is supporting state and local officials in the 
damage assessment of highways, railroads, airports, transit systems, ports and 
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pipelines. The Department of Transportation is supporting detour planning and 
critical transportation system repairs (FEMA, 2005). 
 
Details outlined in reports such as this pointed directly at the mobilization of 
resources and the rapid response to finding shelters for victims and providing them with 
essential emergency supplies, starting the day the storm hit Louisiana. The title of the 
article, “Life Safety Tops FEMA Priorities, Supplies Pour In” suggests both the level of 
importance that FEMA placed on responding to the crisis, as well as the allocation of 
resources to meet the needs of victims.  
 As time passed and the waters receded, FEMA continued to issue weekly 
statements, listing in terms of dollars and people, the recovery efforts. Weekly statements 
similar to the following were produced for Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana:  
 
 
 
$6.7 billion 
To date, FEMA has approved nearly $6.7 billion in federal funding to aid 
Mississippians through various Individual Assistance and Public Assistance programs, 
as well as mission assignments, which FEMA tasked to other federal agencies. 
$2.2 billion 
FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has paid more than $2.2 billion in 
flood insurance claims to policyholders in Mississippi. The NFIP plays a critical role in 
encouraging communities to adopt, implement and enforce broader floodplain-
management regulations and programs. 
$1.5 billion 
The U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Assistance Program has approved 
more than $1.5 billion in low-interest loans for homeowners, renters and business 
owners throughout Mississippi. 
$1.1 billion 
More than $1.1 billion in assistance has been disbursed to nearly 270,000 Mississippi 
households that have registered through FEMA's Individuals and Households Program 
(IHP). The IHP consists of Housing Assistance, which may be used to pay for rent, 
repair or housing construction and Other Needs Assistance (ONA) which may be 
provided for uninsured or under-insured disaster-related necessary expenses. ONA is a 
cost-share program which is 75 percent federally funded, 25 percent state funded. 
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$747 
million 
The Public Assistance program has obligated nearly $747 million for emergency work 
and infrastructure repair. This includes $423 million for debris removal, $42.5 million 
to repair public facilities, $212 million for emergency protective measures, $4 million 
to repair roads and bridges and $50 million to restore public utilities. 
34 million 
Almost 34 million cubic yards of [sic] debris has [sic] been removed from public and 
private property so far. FEMA continues to reimburse Mississippi 100 percent for this 
expense and will do so until March 15, 2006. 
515,600 
More than 515,600 Mississippians have registered for assistance through the FEMA 
toll-free number at 1-800-621-FEMA (3362) or (TTY) 1-800-462-7585 for speech- or 
hearing-impaired applicants or online at www.FEMA.gov . 
99,000 
More than 99,000 people are temporarily housed in nearly 37,000 FEMA-provided 
travel trailers and mobile homes. This includes almost 2,000 units that are mobile 
homes fully compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or are ADA-
friendly travel trailers. 
900 
More than 900 Community Relations (CR) field personnel have operated throughout 
Mississippi since the beginning of disaster response and recovery efforts. CR field 
teams visit communities and distribute resource materials, providing personalized 
assistance and helpful information to individuals, community-based organizations and 
local officials affected by the disaster. There are currently 40 CR field personnel 
working in Mississippi. 
13 
Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) operate throughout Mississippi to assist people 
affected by Hurricane Katrina. More than 426,000 Mississippians have visited DRCs 
since the first one opened Sept. 6, 2005, just days after Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall. 
11 
March 11, 2006, is the deadline for new applications to FEMA's Individuals and 
Households Program. Federal and state officials encourage households affected by 
Hurricane Katrina to seek aid. Assistance to current applicants will continue to be 
provided after this date, but no new applications will be accepted. 
2 
Two easy ways to register for disaster assistance. Call the toll-free FEMA Helpline 
number at 1-800-621-FEMA (3362) or (TTY) 1-800-462-7585 OR register online at 
www.FEMA.gov . People can also call the FEMA Helpline, at the same number, to 
provide additional information or to inquire about the status of an existing registration. 
(FEMA, 2006) 
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 As can be seen in the previous chart, as the recovery efforts shifted from 
immediate emergency response to rebuilding and repairing, the details of the weekly 
reports shifted to demonstrate long term resources still available, the number of federal 
dollars allocated, and the number of families helped. Though the frame constructed by 
these reports remains consistent, the details used to construct the idea that FEMA is 
responding and people are receiving help changed over time. By the one-year anniversary 
of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA issued a series of press releases that contained information 
similar to the following:  
 
Louisiana Statistics through August 17, 2006 
3 Hurricane Katrina was the third strongest hurricane to make landfall in the United 
States. Hurricane Wilma was the strongest and the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935 was 
second strongest. 
12 At the peak of the disaster, 12 mobile DRCs were operating. 
32 Currently, 32 families are living in hotels/motels. 
59 At the beginning of the disaster, there were 59 fixed DRCs. 
150 Currently, 150 housing inspectors are in the field to assess damage to homes. 
12,400 U.S. Small Business Administration has approved more than 12,400 disaster assistance 
loans to businesses and non-profit organizations. 
72,360 SBA has approved 72,360 loans to renters and homeowners. 
418,000 More than 418,000 Louisianians currently hold National Flood Insurance policies. 
950,000 DRC staff has provided, in-person, assistance to more than 950,000 households. 
1 million More than 1 million inspections have been completed to date. 
$1.3 billion SBA has approved a total of $1.3 billion in loans to business owners. 
1.4 million More than 1.4 million applicants have registered for housing and other needs 
assistance. 
45.6 million The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with private contractors working for some 
Louisiana parishes, have removed more than 45.6 million cubic yards of debris under 
a FEMA-funded mission assignment. 
$725 
million 
FEMA approved $725 million in Community Disaster Loans to help keep essential 
services operating in communities hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina. 
$4.7 billion More than $4.7 billion in SBA loans has been approved for renters and homeowners. 
$5.1 billion More than $5.1 billion have been provided to applicants in housing assistance and 
other needs assistance. 
$13.2 
billion 
More than $13.2 billion has been paid under NFIP to policyholders in Louisiana.  
(FEMA, 2005) 
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Reports like this demonstrate the message that FEMA attempted to convey 
through framing their response efforts by the numbers: FEMA is taking an active role in 
responding to and meeting the needs of the victims of Hurricane Katrina.  
 
 
News Outlet Framing  
 
As a general consensus, the frames presented by White House and FEMA 
reports suggest a strong, federal response to the disaster in the gulf. In many regards, the 
frames presented by the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today conveyed 
very different ideas about the federal response. Although headlines themselves do not 
construct frames, they do provide valuable insight into the stories they precede. Based on 
Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance (1986), headlines present contextual clues to 
message content with minimal processing effort.  
Headlines such as FEMA Fails Katrina Victims, A Compassionate Bush Was 
Absent Right After Katrina, A Swifter Response to Katrina Was Possible, ‘A Nightmare’ 
of Missing Kids After Katrina, Brown Defends FEMA’s Efforts; Former Agency Director 
Spreads Blame for Failures in Katrina Response all suggest very different stories, but an 
overarching theme presents itself: the response to Katrina, to one extent or another, was 
not sufficient. Within news reports covering the Hurricane Katrina response efforts, three 
prominent themes were found: an insufficient or delayed federal response, a racially 
charged federal response, and a failed federal response.  
 
Insufficiencies  
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In many regards, the understanding that federal response efforts to meeting the 
needs of the victims of Hurricane Katrina were not up to acceptable standards, was a 
prevalent theme in Katrina reporting. As stories in the press broke of stranded 
communities stuck between flooded wastelands weeks after the response efforts began, 
both congresspersons and members of the press investigated what had happened and why 
so many were still without the most basic necessities. In a September 7, 2005 Washington 
Post article, Senator Susan Collins was cited as questioning the weak response, especially 
in light to the extensive funding allocated to emergency preparedness following 
September 11, 2001.  
 
“If our system did such a poor job when there was no enemy, how would the 
federal, state and local governments have coped with a terrorist attack that 
provided no advance warning and that was intent on causing as much death and 
destruction as possible?" the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security 
Committee wondered, announcing a probe into the response to Hurricane Katrina. 
"How is it possible that almost four years to the day after the attacks on our 
country, with billions of dollars spent to improve our preparedness, that a major 
area of our nation was so ill prepared to respond to a catastrophe (Milbank, 
2005)?” 
 
Apart from questions raised about the issue of preparation, emergency responses 
even came under sharp criticism in stories such as the New York Times article titled, 
“Stumbling storm- aid effort put tons of ice on trips to nowhere.” Detailed accounts of 
emergency responders rushing to the scene, only being told to turn around or to move to 
one destination after another, filled headlines across the country. Meanwhile, the 
mobilization of response efforts was even called into question.  
 
Three days after landfall, only a handful of National Guard troops had arrived. 
Those forces were specialized units such as military police companies (to try to 
restore order), small search-and-rescue units (to seek out individuals trapped in 
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attics), small reconnaissance units (to map the devastation) and small medical 
units (Southern Maryland Extra, 2005). 
 
 Even as the response effort shifted from immediate emergency response to 
rebuilding, criticisms drawn from federal investigation on the response effort were 
present. “Criticism of the government’s sluggish response to Hurricane Katrina was 
largely deserved, the Homeland Security Departments internal watchdog concludes in a 
report rapping the agency for focusing on terrorism at the expense of preparing for 
natural disasters” (Leavitt, 2006) . Stories similar to these paint a clear picture that the 
federal response was neither timely nor effective.  
  
Racial Undertones 
 
 While stories were occasionally run throughout the year following the storm, for 
approximately a two week period near the onset of the emergency response efforts, 
stories of racial indignation on behalf of the Bush Administration were found in all three 
papers. The theme first broke in a September 4, 2005 story wherein Lani Guinier, a 
Harvard University law professor expressed the following sentiment regarding the 
administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina:  
  
Poor black people are "the canary in the mine. Poor black people are the 
throwaway people. And we pathologize them in order to justify our disregard. But 
this is not just about poor black people in New Orleans. This is about a social 
movement, with an administration that is bent on weakening the capacity of the 
national government to act. . . . I hope this is a wake-up call to all of America. To 
see this as the tip of the iceberg, the thin edge of the wedge. We ignored the early 
warning signals. But this is another early warning that we are ill prepared to 
function as a society (Duke & Wiltz, 2005). 
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The incorporation of this kind of analysis in news reporting certainly 
demonstrates how the media has moved beyond its role of agenda setting and into agenda 
extension. In the wake of the greatest natural disaster to hit the United States, stories 
continued to appear developing this frame further. On September 12, 2005, the 
Washington Post broke a story, citing the current President. 
“I mean, it's puzzling, given his immediate response during 9/11, that he did not 
feel a greater sense of empathy towards the folks that were experiencing this 
enormous disaster," Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) said yesterday on ABC's "This 
Week” (Fletcher, 2005). 
While stories similar to these were consistently prevalent for roughly two weeks 
of this fifty-two week study, the argument still underscores the major interpretation of the 
federal response efforts, one of inadequacy. ." 
A Failed Response  
 
 Either as the central frame applied to the federal response effort or a 
subcomponent of another theme, some printed news outlets framed the response efforts 
as a failure. Typically, stories that framed the response as a failure include grim details of 
what appear to be something out of a horror story. Regardless, some stories cast the 
previously framed delayed response as the equivalent of not responding at all.  
 
When it became clear that tens of thousands were marooned, the federal 
government was unprepared to rush life-saving supplies to the city's Superdome 
and convention center, to rescue the stranded and sick or keep order in the streets 
(FEMA fails katrina victims, 2005). 
 
The adversarial agenda present within articles similar to this asserted the simple 
fact that the government was not poised to respond any better than they did should be 
taken into consideration when assessing the overall success of failure of the effort. This 
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approach, without otherwise coming out and stating it, framed the response as either an 
all or nothing success.  
 
Katrina exposed FEMA as a dysfunctional organization, paralyzed in a crisis four 
years after the supposedly galvanizing attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. And it turned 
Brown -- a former executive of the International Arabian Horse Association who 
had no emergency management experience before joining the Bush administration 
-- into a symbol of government ineptitude (Grunwald & Glasser, 2005). 
 
 
Labeling the organization responsible for emergency response efforts and the 
director of the organization as inept, certainly frame the agency, and any forthcoming 
content, as inadequate. The construction of the response efforts as a failure in 
governmental responsibility lends itself to the overarching theme present within almost 
all of the stories published by printed news stories. At the very least, news outlets 
constructed a frame which demonstrated a government either incapable or unwilling to 
respond to the needs of its citizens in crisis.  
  
Coinciding Frames  
 
Having now looked at how FEMA, the White House, and printed news outlets 
framed the response efforts, we can look to where frames coincided. In many respects, 
themes presented by both FEMA and the White House overlapped at various points. 
Although these overlaps do not demonstrate overlaps in framing, they do point to 
elements of the two frames that coincide. Both organizations framed the response efforts 
in terms of a strong, centralized approached. While the White House reports focused on 
the overarching message of governmental mobilization, FEMA provided more specific 
details outlining how the government had mobilized response and recovery efforts. While 
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the White House approached the frame from a more diplomatic, public affairs 
perspective, FEMA constructed the frame around detail orientation and construction.  
 
Contradicting Frames 
 
Given the similarities between FEMA and White House reporting, it’s no surprise 
that their frames differed from the news outlets. The White House framed the response 
effort as a strong, centralized approach. The frames constructed around the racial tensions 
and adequacy of response efforts posed by media outlets clearly contradicts the White 
House’s interpretation of the events. A reason for this contradiction may be that both 
frames speak to different issues. First, the White House constructed a frame to suggest 
that the response effort was exhaustive, and a primary focus of the Bush Administration. 
This interpretation does not suggest a definitive ruling as a failure or a success, but rather 
an interpretation which suggests that solving problems and helping victims was the name 
of the game. The media’s framing of the response as either a success or a failure requires 
a value-laden assessment of the response efforts. At the point that the White House never 
attempted to frame the response in a value-laden approach, these interpretations seem to 
counteract each other without actually directly clashing. 
Another contradiction came from competing interpretations as to the level of the 
response efforts. A major frame presented by news outlets was that of lacking federal 
response. The general interpretation of articles which constructed this frame suggests that 
FEMA was ill prepared to handle such a crisis, and in turn dropped the ball on getting aid 
to those in need. In stark contrast to this message, FEMA’s approach to constructing 
frames with the “by the numbers” approach would suggest that resources were in fact 
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mobilized, and reports citing specific details of the number of families served and the 
amount of aid given would contradict the frame presented by news outlets.  
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
 
Reporting on Hurricane Katrina differed greatly between government and news 
sources. Government reports often described the response effort as successful. These 
stories described a victim-centered approach to the response, the deployment of all 
available resources, and an ongoing effort to ensure the rebuilding of the Gulf region.  
 Stories published by news outlets described the event in terms of the 
shortcomings and failures they deemed apparent at the time. News outlets focused on a 
disorganized response effort; a non-existent response effort; a racially charged response: 
and the inadequacy of the Bush Administration paired with an inept leadership over 
FEMA. 
Looking to the first research question regarding how the White House framed the 
hurricane response, the overarching frame is that of a highly focused, results oriented 
White House. Through the articulation of successful response measures and continued 
focus to return the gulf to its original state, the White House constructed a frame of a 
strong governmental response.  
The second research questions asked how FEMA framed the recovery efforts. 
Through a more detail-oriented approach, FEMA constructed a frame of an exhaustive 
and long-term recovery response. 
 To the third research question, how printed news outlets framed the response, 
outlets varied in how they framed the recovery efforts. While the overarching theme 
suggests that the response efforts were inadequate, the frames constructed include a failed 
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response effort, a racially motivated response effort, or a delayed/dysfunctional response 
effort.  
As to the fourth research question, regarding coinciding frames, although there 
were points of overlap in the way in which FEMA and the White House framed the 
recovery efforts, the two frames varied slightly, both in their construction and overall 
interpretation.  
To the last research question, regarding the contradiction of frames, there were 
several points of contention. First, the White House and news outlets framed the federal 
approach in different ways. Although the White House presented the frame as a strong, 
focused federal approach, news outlets framed the response in terms of a failed 
fragmented debacle of the Bush Administration.  
Second, FEMA framed the response efforts in terms of a detailed construction of 
response methods employed, whereas news outlets framed the response in terms of a 
lacking federal response. These two frames provide a glaring contradiction, which may 
be explained in the value-laden approach to assess the response efforts employed by news 
outlets.  
 To some extent, the differences in framing can be attributed to the sources each 
used to acquire their information. In many regards, the lack of source knowledge prevents 
the reader from adequately assessing the response in a non-biased manner. Although we 
know that the White House received their news from FEMA, and FEMA received their 
news from operations on the ground, the news reporting sources are largely unknown. It 
is highly unlikely that news reports were drawn from thin air, but the influences upon the 
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development of the stories would provide valuable insight into the discrepancy between 
governmental and non-governmental news sources.  
 Ultimately, these results would suggest a biased approach from both types of 
sources. The governmental reports never seem to clash head on with the reports published 
in major news outlets, as they appear to construct the event as a tragedy that received the 
best possible response, given the limitations imposed. This type of reporting goes along 
with the required “record it” theme present in most governmental publication. These 
reports tend to provide detailed lists of what was being done, and little analysis of the 
issues being discussed. It seems reasonable to assert that the limited analysis provided in 
White House and FEMA reports would suggest either an acknowledgement of failure, or 
a disregard towards responding to contradictory stories presented by the press.  
 Alternatively, news outlets published stories following the release of White House 
and FEMA reports that appear to contradict these stories. Just as governmental reports 
failed to address the claims of news reporters covering the response, news outlets failed 
to address government reports head on. It was the exclusive construction of 
organizational frames that opened both governmental and news reports to significant 
criticism.    
 
Limitations 
 
 One limitation to this type of research is researcher bias. Although researcher bias 
cannot be entirely eliminated from the textual analysis, the sheer number of stories 
looked, as paired with researcher efforts to read and re-read the stories should ensure 
these frames are an adequate representation of the reports. Additionally, the fact that the 
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data used in this study were strictly limited to printed news media may not account for all 
possible frames constructed around the response to Hurricane Katrina. Lastly, due to the 
highly specific nature of this study, the results may not be generalizable to other studies 
of textual framing analysis in crisis situations.  
 
Heuristics  
 
 Although this research provides clear insight into the way in which the 
government and the press frames the response to Hurricane Katrina, there are several 
areas in which the research could be expounded. Most notably, looking to the 
organizational construction of frames presented by media outlets would posit an 
insightful extension of the current research. Additionally, performing a quantitative 
framing analysis could enhance the internal validity of this study to confirm the 
prevalence of themes, which go into the construction of a frame.  
Outside of this study, there are several areas of inquiry which could be examined 
to better understand the frames surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Looking at how the 
ground reporters constructed stories versus how office-bound journalists reported on the 
events would provide clarity to the question of reporter bias. Additionally, a separate 
study looking at how televised reports framed the event could yield insightful analysis to 
understanding how Katrina was framed.  
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Appendix B – Executive Summary 
 
Purpose 
  
Hurricane Katrina is widely regarded as the greatest natural disaster to ever befall 
the United States. Following the storms devastation of the Gulf Coast region, a media 
firestorm unleashed, seeking to ascribe responsibility to governmental actors for the 
“failed” response effort. Through a comparative framing analysis, this study sought to 
investigate how major news outlets, the White House, and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency framed the response efforts that followed Hurricane Katrina.  
 
Framing Analysis 
 
To understand framing analysis, one must first understand what a frame is. Jim 
Kuypers, political communication scholar and framing researcher defined framing as “a 
process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point 
of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a 
particular manner” (Kuypers, 2010).” The process of framing a particular event requires 
the construction of a particular viewpoint, emphasizing certain facts to produce a specific 
interpretation of that event. From this, the term frame can be understood as the central or 
underlying theme under which the facts or details are organized.  
 When put in the context of news reporting, the demonstration of the process 
becomes clear. Rarely do news reports contain every detail of an event. If reporting every 
detail in a detailed manner became the norm, the news would not be digestible. Instead, 
news reports collect the data necessary to relay the general details of a particular event to 
the audience. The process by which the author filters certain details out, includes others, 
or highlights specific details more than others demonstrates the construction of a frame. 
73 
 
For the most part, this practice is essential for the press to perform its function of 
reporting. However, at times, personal or institutional biases influence the decision as to 
what to include, exclude, or highlight in a given story. 
 Framing analysis is an ideal research method for analyzing large amounts of data. 
The data consists of stories, releases, and briefing, with an array of implications. 
However, framing analysis can only speak to the characteristics of the coverage, not the 
implications. This approach gives us the ability to look at central organizing themes 
throughout the data, instead of evaluating each piece independently. Comparative 
framing analysis allows us to then compare and contrast frames from the respective 
organizations to gain a richer understanding of messages communicated regarding the 
governmental response to Hurricane Katrina.  
 
Research Questions 
 
To understand the phenomena, the following research questions were posed:  
 
RQ 1: How did the White House frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina? 
 
RQ 2: How did FEMA frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina? 
 
RQ 3: How did printed news outlets frame the response to Hurricane Katrina? 
 
RQ 4:  Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press coincide?  
 
RQ 5:  Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press contradict? 
 
Methods 
 
 A comparative framing analysis was conducted in this study. The study examined 
how news media outlets and government entities framed the events of and response 
efforts to Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, the study compared the frames present within 
sixty-five press briefings by the Office of the Press Secretary, 185 press releases from the 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and contrasted them to the frames 
presented in 312 printed newspaper articles for one calendar year following the storm 
making landfall in the gulf. The study focused on printed news stories published by The 
Washington Post, The New York Times, and USA Today.  
 Articles were retrieved by using the LexisNexis database. Boolean expressions 
were used for article identification including “hurricane” and “Katrina” in headlines and 
leads. Press releases and briefings were collected from the FEMA Press Release Archives 
and Office of the Press Secretary Archives, respectively. Articles and releases that made 
minimal references to the storm (eg. obituaries, opinion editorials, and news briefs) were 
excluded from the study.  
To identify the frames the researcher read each article, briefing, and press release 
and determined the thesis or organizing theme it contained. Each was compiled in a list, 
according to the organization that produced it. Once all of the data was examined, the 
process was repeated, as to confirm the validity of the frames. From there, the frames, 
based on relatively frequency, were documented and reported. From these results, 
identifying where frames coincided or contradicted was a matter of evaluating points of 
intersection.   
 
Findings 
 
 The White House often described the response in terms of the allocation of 
federal resources, shifting the focus to response efforts, instead of addressing 
questions of failure, avoiding the blame game, and eventually, acknowledging the 
lessons learned in crisis communication.  
 FEMA described the response effort in terms of an all-encompassing approach. 
Quite literally, the “by the numbers” approach taken by FEMA pointed to the 
allocation of all available resources to meeting the needs of the residents of Gulf 
Coast.  
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 News outlets described the response in terms of inadequacies and failures, 
specifically: 
o Lack of federal action 
o Lack of federal action, due to the racial composition of New Orleans 
o Delayed federal action 
o Failed response efforts 
 Frames coincided in the following areas:  
o Both FEMA and the White House coincided on response efforts, in terms 
of focusing efforts on the needs of the victims. 
 Frames contradicted in the following areas: 
o The White House framing of the federal response effort compared news 
outlet reporting on the response effort. 
o FEMA’s framing of the detailed approach compared to the news outlet 
reporting of a lack of response efforts.  
 
Limitations 
 
The following limitations were noted in this study: 
 The data set was limited to printed sources, which may not account for every 
frame. 
 Researcher bias could affect the identification of frames. 
 The findings of this study cannot be generalized to other forms of crisis reporting.  
 
Future Research 
 
This study provides a springboard for additional research on the matter of framing the 
response to Hurricane Katrina. Some possible areas of exploration are: 
 Replicating the study with the inclusion of local newspaper. 
 Replicating the study with the inclusion of electronic media sources. 
 Replicating the study with the inclusion of electronic governmental sources. 
 Performing a visual framing analysis of still photography or video photography to 
examine additional or alternative frames. 
 Performing a quantitative content analysis to establish the statistical significance 
of frames.  
 Studying the differences in news reports from journalists on the ground in New 
Orleans, versus those based out of their central offices.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Comparative framing analysis provides a critical perspective in understanding 
how organizations ascribe meaning to events. While governmental reports tended to 
focus on the resource allocation and dedication to helping the victims of the storm, news 
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outlets tended to frame the response effort as “too little, too late.” Looking at how the two 
outlets reached different conclusions regarding the same response demonstrates the 
diversity and richness of mass communication.   
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